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Indigenous Rights Litigation, Legal
History, and the Role of Experts
Kent McNeil*
Litigation involving the rights of Indigenous peoples in Canada
usually involves historical facts and events from a long time ago,
sometimes as far back as 400 years. 1 This reality presents significant
challenges for proof of the facts upon which these rights are based. In
addition to historical documents, the parties have to rely on testimony
by Indigenous witnesses who are able to present the oral histories and
traditions of their people, as well as on the opinion evidence of
experts such as archaeologists, anthropologists, linguists, historians,
ethnohistorians, and legal historians. In this paper, I examine the role
of legal historians in Indigenous rights cases, using the example of
one academic in particular as an illustration. But first it is necessary
to distinguish between law and history because, as a general rule,
expert witnesses cannot testify and offer opinions on applicable
domestic law. In the common law system, domestic law is within the
purview of judges and not a matter of evidence. 2 So where is the line
Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. A version of this paper was presented at
Indigenous Bar Association Annual Conference, Rama, Ontario, 8 October 2013,
and at the Intensive Program in Aboriginal Lands, Resources and Governments
at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, 2 April 2014. I would like to thank the
participants at those events for their insightful comments on my presentation. I
am also very grateful for helpful feedback on drafts of this paper generously
provided by Allan Beever, Benjamin Berger, Amar Bhatia, Andree Boisselle, David
Dyzenhaus, Hamar Foster, Philip Girard, Douglas Hay, Allan Hutchinson, Shin
Imai, Jim Miller, Arthur Ray, Kathy Simo, Mark Walters & Kerry Wilkins. The
opinions and any errors in this paper are nonetheless my own.
1 See e.g. R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101, 138 DLR (4th) 657 where the accused had
to prove that fishing for food in Lake St Francis in what is now Quebec had been
a practice, custom, or tradition integral to the Mohawks' distinctive culture at the
time of contact with the French in 1603.
2 Domestic law is the law of the jurisdiction where the case is being tried (see Ron
Delisle, Don Stuart & David Tanovich, Evidence: Principles and Problems, 9th ed
(Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 387-89; David M Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of
Evidence, 6th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 186). Foreign law and local custom
(including the laws and customs of Indigenous peoples) are not part of the
domestic law that a judge is assumed to know and so they generally do have to be
proven by expert testimony (see Adrian Keane, James Griffiths & Paul McKeown,
The Modern Law of Evidence, 8th ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 33,
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between law and history to be drawn in the context of legal proceedings
involving Indigenous rights?
In attempting to answer this question, one needs to take account
of a debate, originating mainly in New Zealand and Australia, over the
place and appropriate use of history in Indigenous claims,3 especially,
but not limited toj claims involving lands and resources.s Although
this debate has not yet had the same impact in Canada, 6 an attempt
526-27). I am grateful to my colleague, Benjamin Berger, for helping me understand
the role of expert witnesses and the distinction between current domestic law and
law that belongs to the legal history of a particular jurisdiction.
3 In Australia, this debate arose mainly out of Mabo v Queensland (No 2), [1992] HCA
23, (1992) 175 CLR 1 [Mabo], in which the High Court decided that the denial of
non-statutory Indigenous land rights by Australian governments and courts for
200 years was legally wrong and no longer acceptable.
4 Another context for this debate concerns the "stolen generations" of Indigenous
children who were taken from their families in Australia (see e.g. Peter Read, The
Stolen Generations: The Removal of Aboriginal Children in New South Wales 1883 to
1969 (Sydney: New South Wales Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, 1982); Robert van
Krieken, "The Barbarism of Civilization: Cultural Genocide and the 'Stolen
Generations' (1999) 50:2 British Journal of Sociology 297; A Dirk Moses, ed,
Genocide and Settler Society: Frontier Violence and Stolen Indigenous Children in
Australian History (New York: Berghahn Books, 2004); Bain Attwood, "In the Age
of Testimony: The Stolen Generations Narrative, 'Distance,' and Public History"
(2008) 20:1 Public Culture 75; Alexander Reilly, "Sovereign Apologies" in Julie
Evans et al, eds, Sovereignty: Frontiers of Possibility (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i
Press, 2013) 196).
5 For a sampling of the extensive literature, see Henry Reynolds, The Law of the Land
(Ringwood, Vic: Penguin, 1987); Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The
Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in New Zealand since the 1970s, 2d ed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Alex Reilly & Ann Genovese, "Claiming
the Past: Historical Understanding in Australian Native Title Jurisprudence"
(2004) 3 Indigenous L 19; Bain Attwood, "The Law of the Land or the Law of the
Land?: History, Law and Narrative in a Settler Society" (2004) 2 History Compass
1 [Attwood, "History, Law and Narrative"]; Ian Hunter, "Natural Law,
Historiography, and Aboriginal Sovereignty" (2007) 11:2 Legal History 137; Ann
Curthoys, Ann Genovese & Alexander Reilly, Rights and Redemption: History, Law
and Indigenous People (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2008).
6 But see Alain Beaulieu, "An Instrumentalized History: Reflections on the Use of
the Past in Aboriginal Claims" (Paper delivered at the Vert, le droit? Conference
des jurists de l'Etat 2009, Quebec City, 22 April 2009), (Cowansville, Que: Yvon
Blais, 2009) 349, online: <http://www.academia.edu/5 129408>; Janna Promislow,
"I smooth'd him up with fair words": Intersocietal law, from fur trade to treaty (PhD
dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 2013) at ch 5 "Treaties in
Law and History" [forthcoming, UBC L Rev]. In Canada, the role of Indigenous
oral histories in proving Aboriginal and treaty rights has received more attention.
See e.g. Lori Ann Roness & Kent McNeil, "Legalizing Oral History: Proving
Aboriginal Claims in Canadian Courts" (2000) 39:3 Journal of the West 66; John
Borrows, "Listening for a Change: The Courts and Oral Tradition" (2001) 39:1
Osgoode Hall U 1; Val Napoleon, "Delgamuukw: A Legal Straightjacket for Oral
Histories?" (2005) 20:2 CJLS 123; Bruce Granville Miller, Oral Histories on Trial:
Recognizing Aboriginal Narratives in the Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).
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to give it more traction here is being made by Dr. Paul McHugh (a
prominent academic from New Zealand who teaches at Cambridge
University) in his published work and, more significantly, as an
expert witness for the Crown as a legal historian in Indigenous rights
cases in Canada. Because I am concerned about the way in which
McHugh is attempting to influence the development of Canadian law
in relation to Indigenous rights, I have structured this paper around
an analysis and critique of his views on the use of history in this
context.7 In doing so, I hope to shed light on the distinction between
history and law and the proper role of legal historians in Indigenous
rights cases.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HISTORY AND LAW
It is trite to observe that historians and lawyers approach and use
history in different ways. Historians are generally interested in history
for its own sake; they study and try to understand and illuminate the
past. McHugh describes this as the "scientific" or "disinterested"
approach to history.8 Legal historians likewise seek to shed light
on the past, specifically by revealing the place of the law and the role
of legal practitioners in given social and political contexts. McHugh
describes the legal historian's task as involving "the disinterested
retrieval and recounting of a past that is specifically or, rather,
primarily legal in character. Basically, it is an enquiry into how
law has operated in the past."9 Of course one can dispute how
disinterested historians in general and legal historians in particular
really are, given that no one, in my opinion, can be entirely disengaged
from political perspective, cultural worldview, and personal bias. 10 In
7 My criticisms of Paul McHugh's views are intellectual and academic. I have known
him since 1980 when we were both at the University of Saskatchewan, and respect
him as a person and a scholar while disagreeing with him fundamentally on some
issues.
8 PG McHugh, Aboriginal Title: The Modern Jurisprudence of Tribal Land Rights
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 274-76 [McHugh, Aboriginal Title]. See
also Paul McHugh, "The Politics of Historiography and the Taxonomies of the
Colonial Past: Law, History and the Tribes" in Anthony Musson & Chantal
Stebbings, eds, Making Legal History: Approaches and Methodologies (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 164 [McHugh, "Politics of Historiography"].
9 McHugh, Aboriginal Title, ibid at 274. See also Frederick Bernays Wiener, "Uses and
Abuses of Legal History: A Practitioner's View" (Selden Society Lecture, delivered at
the Old Hall, Lincoln's Inn, 29 March 1962), (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1962): "legal
history itself is essentially a record of changing rules and doctrines" (ibid at 16).
10 Witness the "history wars" that have raged during the past twenty years over the
proper interpretation of Australia's past, in particular with regard to the treatment
of the Indigenous peoples. In addition to works cited in supra note 5, see e.g. Bain
Attwood, Telling the Truth About Aboriginal History (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen &
Unwin, 2005); Lorenzo Veracini, "A Prehistory of Australia's History Wars: The
Evolution of Aboriginal History during the 1970s and 1980s" (2006) 52:3
Australian Journal of Politics and History 439; Bain Attwood & Tom Griffiths, eds,
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theory, however, the role of the historian is to shine an objective light
on the past.11
Lawyers, on the other hand, take a more instrumental approach:
they are interested in using history to help resolve present-day disputes.
To do this, they tend to search the past selectively for facts and
precedents that can be used and applied to the legal problems they
are trying to solve. McHugh refers to this practical use of the past
as "presentism," which he defines as "use of the past for present
purposes":12
The common lawyer's use of the past is, therefore, seen
through the lens of the present, which renders the questions
and issues for the resolution of which the past is the primary
resource. The report of that past is marshalled around the
demands presently being made of the law.13
I agree with McHugh that lawyers make practical use of the past by
"seeing [it] in terms of the requirements of the present."14 However,
I think he fails to adequately distinguish between the use lawyers
make of history and the use they make of law. These are entirely
different inquiries. As stated by F.W. Maitland, in a passage McHugh
quotes, one has to be very careful not "to mix up two different logics,
the logic of authority, and the logic of evidence."s Maitland was
distinguishing here between the logic employed by lawyers who look
to the past for precedents to resolve contemporary legal disputes and
the logic used by legal historians who are interested in evidence of
how the law was understood and applied in the past. Immediately
after quoting this statement, McHugh observes that Maitland (along
with A.V. Dicey)16 was "sure that the historian required evidence and
was concerned with questions of origin and what 'was,' matters that
Frontier, Race, and Nation: Henry Reynolds and Australian History (Melbourne:
Australian Scholarly, 2009).
11 See Attwood, "History, Law and Narrative," supra note 5 at 20: "With works of
history, the author undertakes to represent the past as truthfully to that time as
he or she can." On the attainability of this goal, see William Twining, Rethinking
Evidence: Explanatory Essays (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), ch 4 at 103-112. For
detailed discussion of the distinction between history and law in the context of
Indigenous peoples' rights, see Promislow, supra note 6.
12 McHugh, Aboriginal Title, supra note 8 at 275.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid at 276. See also Allan C Hutchinson, Evolution and the Common Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 6.
15 "Why the History of English Law is not Written" in HAL Fisher, ed, The Collected
Papers of Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911)
vol 1, 480 at 491, quoted in McHugh, Aboriginal Title, supra note 8 at 274.
16 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed (London:
Macmillan & Co, 1959) at 22.
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did not strictly concern the lawyer."' 7 Now if McHugh means by this
that lawyers (unlike legal historians) are generally not concerned
with how law operated in the past, but only with how it applies in
the present, I think he is right. But regarding the facts of history, as
opposed to "legal" history, lawyers are just as concerned as historians
with what "was," as every case must have a factual basis that depends
on what actually happened in the past.18
In a courtroom, history is a matter of fact, part of Maitland's
"logic of evidence," that has to be either proven by testimony and
documentary sources or accepted through judicial notice. 19 Lawyers
will, of course, search the past for historical evidence that supports
their client's case; this is part of their professional obligation.20 But
they can also expect their opponent to do the same. Neither side
intends to present an entirely disinterested historical account to the
court. Instead, both are advocates trying to convince the court that
history (i.e. the facts) favours their client's case. Judges, however, are in
a different position. They are supposed to be disinterested and impartial,
and (in the absence of a jury) make findings of historical fact to the
best of their ability based on the evidence presented by both sides. 21
McHugh contends that, given their goal of seeking certain solutions
for current legal problems, lawyers tend to decontextualize and
oversimplify history.22 He also accuses them of failing to distinguish
adequately between legal argument supporting Aboriginal title today
and the historical foundations for that title. In a particularly sarcastic
passage, he writes:
Those unable to apprehend the distinction between the
legal and historical foundation of aboriginal title have
17 McHugh, Aboriginal Title, supra note 8 at 274.
18 Paraphrasing Maitland in the sentence immediately before the one quoted at
supra note 14, McHugh writes that "Maitland saw the common lawyer's interest
in the past as no more than a trawling for the authority of precedent" (Aboriginal
Title, ibid). But it seems to me that this trawling exercise relates to the "logic of
authority," not to the "logic of evidence" that relates to relevant historical facts
that are of equal interest to lawyers.
19 Judges can take judicial notice of undisputed historical facts and, more controversially,
conduct their own historical research in relation to the case before them (see Read
v Bishop of Lincoln, [1892] AC 644 at 652-54, [1891-94] All ER Rep 227, Lord
Halsbury; Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B), [1949] AC 196
at 234, [1949] 1 All ER 1, Lord du Parcq; R v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025 at 1050, 70
DLR (4th) 427, Lamer J).
20 See Wiener, supra note 9 at 31-32; RP Boast, "Lawyers, Historians, Ethics and the
Judicial Process" (1998) 28:1 VUWLR 87.
21 See R v Marshall, [1999] 3 SCR 456 at para 37, 177 DLR (4th) 513, Binnie J.
22 "Lawyers seek to allay anxiety about the contingency of the present, and the
future, and do so by removing it from their account of the past" (McHugh,
Aboriginal Title, supra note 8 at 284).
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tended to be lawyers, wedded (blinkered, more like) to the
declaratory theory's belief that contemporary doctrine
articulates eternal verities as available to past (though, of
course, less clever) actors as themselves-re-educating the
dead, as Bartleson [sic] put it.23
But I think McHugh himself fails to take sufficient account of the
distinction between law and historical fact. In formulating a common
law doctrine of Aboriginal title, lawyers have sought legal precedents
from the past that would support Indigenous land claims today.
These precedents are part of the historical development of the common
law itself; they are not "eternal verities" that lawyers discover in the
present and inappropriately apply to the past.
To better understand the nature of my disagreement with
McHugh, we need to examine the declaratory theory more carefully.
Simplistically stated, the theory is that common law judges do not
make law, they just "discover" and declare it.24 In Parker v. British
Airways Board,25 Lord Donaldson put it this way: "As a matter of legal
theory, the common law has a ready-made solution for every problem
and it is only for the judges, as legal technicians, to find it."26 But, as
he went on to observe,
[t]he reality is somewhat different. Take the present case.
The conflicting rights of finder and occupier have indeed
been considered by various courts in the past. But under
the rules of English jurisprudence, none of their decisions
binds this court. We therefore have both the right and the
duty to extend and adapt the common law in the light
of established principles and the current needs of the
community. This is not to say that we start with a clean
sheet. In doing so, we should draw from the experience of
the past as revealed by the previous decisions of the courts.27
So while the view that the declaratory theory is "fiction" is not entirely
incorrect, 28 the theory does not depend on, as McHugh put it, a "belief
23 Ibid at 283. The reference is to Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) at 57.
24 See Peter Wesley-Smith, "Theories of Adjudication and the Status of Stare Decisis" in
Laurence Goldstein, ed, Precedent in Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 73 at 73-82.
25 [1982] 1 All ER 834 at 836, [1982] 2 WLR 503 (CA) [Parker].
26 Ibid. The Parker case involved a dispute over entitlement to a gold bracelet between
the finder of it (Parker) and the occupier of the premises where it had been found
(British Airways).
27 Ibid.
28 However, classifying the theory as fiction does not mean it has no legitimate place
in the common law. Fictions are very much a part, in some instances a necessary
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that contemporary doctrine articulates eternal verities." 29 Common
law methodology is much more nuanced than that. In deciding cases
where the law is still uncertain (which is usually the situation in
appeal courts), judges do, as Lord Donaldson stated, properly consider
"previous decisions," "established principles," and "the current needs
of the community."30 The common law is neither divorced from, nor
rigidly tied to the past.3 ' These observations apply as much to the
doctrine of Aboriginal title as to the rest of the common law.
And yet McHugh seems to think that the articulation in the 1990s
of the common law doctrine of Aboriginal title by the highest courts
in Australia and Canada in particular was "presentist" and ahistorical
in the sense that the judges constructed new law and then applied it
backwards to a time when Indigenous peoples had no legal rights to
their traditional lands. He states:
[T]hroughout the nineteenth century and most of the
twentieth, the legal position had been that technically the
part, of our legal tradition. On the development and role of legal fictions, see Sir
Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society
and its Relation to Modern Ideas (New York: Dorset Press, 1986) at 17-36; Peter Birks,
"Fictions Ancient and Modern" in Neil MacCormick & Peter Birks, eds, The Legal
Mind: Essays for Tony Honore (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) 83; JH Baker, The
Law's Two Bodies: Some Evidential Problems in English Legal History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001) at 33-57 [Baker, Law's Two Bodies].
29 McHugh, Aboriginal Title, supra note 8 at 283. See also PG McHugh, Aboriginal
Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self-Determination
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 18 [McHugh, Aboriginal Societies]. For a
review of Aboriginal Societies that raises some of the concerns that I express in this
paper, see Mark D Walters, "Histories of Colonialism, Legality, and Aboriginality"
(2007) 57:4 UTLJ 819.
30 See also Harrison v Carswell, [1976] 2 SCR 200 at 218, 62 DLR (3d) 68 [Harrison], per
Dickson J: "The duty of the Court, as I envisage it, is to proceed in the discharge
of its adjudicative function in a reasoned way from principled decision and
established concepts."
31 See Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making, 7th ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1964) at 307:
A judge, in laying down a rule to meet these situations [where there is
no precedent to guide the decision of the court], is certainly making a
new contribution to our law, but only within limits, usually well
defined. If he has to decide upon the authority of natural justice, or
simply "the common sense of the thing" [(Pearce v Gardner, [1897] 1
QB 688 (CA) at 690 (Lord Esher MR))], he employs that kind of natural
justice or common sense which he has absorbed from the study of law
and which he believes to be consistent with the general principles of
English jurisprudence.
See also Benjamin N Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1921); Wiener, supra note 9 at 16; Frederic Reynold, The Judge as
Lawmaker (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1967); Louis L Jaffe, English and American
Judges as Lawmakers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).
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tribes' land was vested in the Crown as sovereign and that
any aboriginal interest was protected by and through the
Crown. This was an expression of the feudal doctrine of
tenures according to which all enforceable legal title to
land derived from a Crown grant ...The reasoning ran that
since tribal occupation did not rest upon a Crown-derived
basis and remained un-granted land, the tribe had no land
rights of which a common law court might take cognizance. 32
While this feudal basis for denying Indigenous land rights in the
Crown's settled colonies did indeed have resonance in Australia prior
to the High Court's 1992 decision in Mabo33 and was relied upon by
Justice Blackburn of the Northern Territory Supreme Court in 1971 in
Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd.,34 the legal status of Indigenous land
rights in Canada remained an open question 3S until all doubt was
removed in 1973 by the Supreme Court's acknowledgement of the
legality of these rights in Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney-General).3 6
But beyond pointing out that the law in relation to Indigenous
land rights in the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries was
not as settled as McHugh seems to think,37 the argument I want to
32 McHugh, Aboriginal Title, supra note 8 at 111. In reality, however, even in England
it was recognized early on that the doctrine of tenures does not have a factual
basis. The fiction of Crown grants was a "supposition in law" invented to explain
and support the feudal doctrine of tenures. See Charles Yorke, Considerations on the
Law of Forfeitures, for High Treason, 4th ed (London: J Williams, 1775) at 64-65. See
also William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1765-69) vol 2 at 51; Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives
of the Crown; and the Relative Duties and Rights of the Subject (London: Joseph
Butterworth & Son, 1820) at 211.
33 Supra note 3.
34 (1971) 17 FLR 141, [1972-73] ALR 65. For an argument based on English precedent
and legal principle predating British colonization (see works cited in supra note
28), that the Australian courts prior to Mabo, ibid, misunderstood the fictional
nature and colonial relevance of the doctrine of tenures, see Kent McNeil, "A
Question of Title: Has the Common Law Been Misapplied to Dispossess the
Aboriginals?" (1990) 16:1 Monash UL Rev 91 [McNeil, "Question of Title"].
35 See e.g. the differences in opinion and the inconclusive pronouncements on
Aboriginal title expressed by the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada and Privy
Council in St Catharines Milling and Lumber Co v The Queen (1887), 13 SCR 577 and
St Catherine's [sic] Milling and Lumber Co v The Queen, [1888] UKPC 70, 14 App Cas
46 [St Catherine's Milling].
36 [1973] SCR 313, 34 DLR (3d) 145 [Calder]. Importantly, the majority of the
Supreme Court in Calder decided that, although Aboriginal title entailed legal
rights, it was not justiciable because the plaintiffs had not obtained permission
from the Crown to bring legal action against it.
37 See Hamar Foster, "Letting Go the Bone: The Idea of Indian Title in British
Columbia, 1849-1927" in Hamar Foster & John McLaren, eds, Essays in the History
of Canadian Law (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1995) vol
6, 28; Hamar Foster, "We Are Not O'Meara's Children: Law, Lawyers, and the First
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make is broader, going to the very nature of judicial decision-making
and the vital distinction between fact and law. If I understand him
correctly, McHugh is suggesting that, in the context of Indigenous
land rights, common law doctrine did not exist until the latter part
of the twentieth century when it was created by judges who ignored
the historical context and applied the doctrine retroactively to an
earlier time. In my opinion, this is not the way the common law
works. Rather, when cases involving unresolved legal questions
come before the courts, judges are obliged to say what the law is, but
as Lord Donaldson explained in the Parker decision they are not
working in a legal vacuum. 3 8 Just because a legal issue has not yet
been resolved by a court does not mean there is no law in relation
thereto. 39 On the contrary, the matter may not have gone to court
because legal practitioners were in no doubt about the relevant law.
Or, as where Indigenous land rights are concerned, the people who
might have asserted the rights in court were unable to do so because
they did not understand the legal system, 40 did not have the financial
resources to hire lawyers, or were legally prevented from litigating,
either by Crown immunity from suit41 or by discriminatory laws such
Campaign for Aboriginal Title in British Columbia, 1908-28" in Hamar Foster,
Heather Raven & Jeremy Webber, eds, Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder
Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 61 [Foster,
"Not O'Meara's Children"]; and Hamar Foster, "One Good Thing: Law, Elevator
Etiquette and Litigating Aboriginal Rights in Canada" (2010) 37:1 Advocates' Q 66
[Foster, "One Good Thing"].
38 McHugh acknowledges that the late twentieth-century Indigenous land rights
decisions were not made "in a legal vacuum," but nonetheless maintains that
"they represented a paradigm shift and the assertion by the courts of a new role
in what until then had been the mostly non-justiciable" (McHugh, Aboriginal
Title, supra note 8 at 31).
39 See Baker, Law's Two Bodies, supra note 28 at 59-90.
40 See Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 SCC 14 at paras
147-49, [2013] 1 SCR 123. Compare McHugh, "Politics of Historiography," supra
note 8 at 190: "By the mid nineteenth century, tribes were becoming better versed
in the ways of Anglo-settler polity and had they been able to enforce a common
law aboriginal title against the Crown, then surely that would have happened."
41 In the common law, the Crown could not be sued in its own courts without its
consent, which is why the Nisga'a Nation's claim to Aboriginal title in Calder,
supra note 36, was dismissed by the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada (see
Foster, "Not O'Meara's Children," supra note 37 at 70-79). This Crown immunity
has been removed by statute in the United Kingdom and Canada (see the Crown
Proceedings Act, 1947, (UK), 10 & 11 Geo VI, c 44; Petition of Right Amendment Act,
SC 1951, c 33; Crown Proceedings Act, SBC 1974, c 24; Walter Clode, The Law and
Practice of Petition of Right under the Petitions of Right Act, 1860 (London: William
Clowes and Sons, 1887); H Street, Governmental Liability: A Comparative Study
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953) at 1-7; Peter W Hogg, Patrick J
Monahan & Wade K Wright, Liability of the Crown, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell,
2011) at 5, 8- 10.
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as the section of the Canadian Indian Act enacted in 192742 that made
it an offence, absent written permission from the Superintendent
General of Indian Affairs, for anyone to solicit or receive funds from
Indians to pursue any of their claims.43 Or, as in the case of the
Milirrpum decision in Australia, a trial judge may have misapplied the
common law,44 though this did not become apparent until the High
Court overruled that decision in Mabo.
This brings me back to the distinction between fact and law. In a
common law court, history is a matter of fact. In cases involving
Indigenous rights, lawyers and judges treat it as such. In Aboriginal
title and treaty claims in Canada, for example, lawyers often spend
huge amounts of time presenting historical evidence to the court
through witnesses, and trial judges devote large portions of their
judgments outlining their factual findings.45 The lawyers and judges
are also completely aware that legal argument about the applicable
law is distinct from factual evidence about history. They understand
that the relevant domestic law is not a matter of history that has to
be proven by evidence, but depends instead on Maitland's "logic of
authority." This is not to say that the common law has a ready-made
solution to every novel issue that arises in the context of Indigenous
claims. But the common law, along with equity, does contain principles
and precedents honed over centuries of development that are relevant
to Indigenous claims. For example, in applying to Aboriginal title
claims the common law rule that a person in occupation of land has
a title derived from the occupation, the Supreme Court in
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia4 6 simply acknowledged the relevance
to these claims of a long-standing common law rule that predated
42 An Act to Amend the Indian Act, SC 1926-27, c 32.
43 Ibid, s 6, continued in the Indian Act, RSC 1927, c 98, s 141, repealed by the Indian
Act, SC 1951, c 29, s 123(2). If the Crown's legal advisers in early twentieth-century
Canada were so sure that Indigenous peoples had no legal rights to their traditional
lands, why did the Parliament of Canada bother to enact this provision? Professor
Paul Tennant, in his book Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question
in British Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1990) at 112, provides this
answer, referring to the sponsors of the amendment after detailing the history
leading up to it: "[T]heir intent was to prevent all land claims activity and, above
all, to block the British Columbia claim from getting to the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council." The timing of the amendment was significant: the Privy
Council, in Amodu Tijani v Secretary, Southern Nigeria, [1921] 2 AC 399, 90 LJPC 236
had decided that the land rights of the Africans in the British colony of Southern
Nigeria continued after Crown acquisition of sovereignty, and the Allied Tribes in
British Columbia planned to rely on this decision in legal action (see Foster, "Not
O'Meara's Children," supra note 37 at 79-84).
44 See McNeil, "Question of Title," supra note 34.
45 See e.g. Tsilhqot'in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, [2008] 1 CNLR 112;
Keewatin v Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources), 2011 ONSC 4801, [2012] 1 CNLR
13, both currently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
46 [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at paras 114, 149, 153 DLR (4th) 193, Lamer CJC [Delgamuukw].
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European colonization of North America.47 Similarly, when the
Supreme Court in Guerin v. The Queen48 decided that the Crown owes
fiduciary duties to First Nations in relation to reserve lands held by
the Crown for their benefit, the judges were adapting and applying
principles of equity that for centuries had governed the dealings of
trustees with land held in trust for beneficiaries. 49 In these cases
the Supreme Court was doing exactly what Lord Donaldson in Parker
said judges have both the right and duty to do, namely "to extend
and adapt the common law [or equity as in Guerin,] in the light of
established principles and the current needs of the community."so In
the context of Indigenous rights, "current needs" identified by the
Supreme Court include the present-day need to reconcile the prior
presence of Indigenous peoples in North America with the assertion
of sovereignty by the Crown.5 1 The Court has also taken account of
the need to adapt existing law to the unique circumstances of
Indigenous peoples. In Guerin, Justice Dickson (as he then was) held
that the Crown's obligation to First Nations is trust-like, but the
relationship is not a true trust. This permitted him to apply fiduciary
principles from trust law to the Crown-First Nation relationship,
while at the same time acknowledging that "the fiduciary obligation
which is owed to the Indians by the Crown is sui generis," given "the
unique character both of the Indians' interest in land and of their
historical relationship with the Crown."5 2
I think McHugh would contend that Guerin, for example,
changed the law by replacing the discretionary, non-justiciable
authority that government officials in the past had exercised over
First Nation lands with legally enforceable obligations because, in his
view, the dealings of representatives of the Crown with Indigenous
peoples prior to what he calls "the breakthrough cases" of the 1970s
through the 1990s were political rather than legal.5 3 In reality,
however, the case is an illustration of one reason why the Crown had
not been held legally accountable for wrongful dealings with First
Nation lands in the past. In the 1950s, officials of the Department of
Indian Affairs negotiated a long-term lease of Musqueam reserve
47 On the common law origins of this rule, see Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal
Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 6-78.
48 [1984] 2 SCR 335, 13 DLR (4th) 321 [Guerin].
49 In my view, Dickson J (as he then was), delivering the principal judgment in
Guerin, ibid, consistently followed the description of the adjudicative function
that he had provided in Harrison, supra note 30.
50 Supra note 25 at 836.
51 See R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, 137 DLR (4th) 2809; Delgamuukw, supra
note 46; Haida Nation v British Columbia, 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511.
52 Guerin, supra note 48 at 387.
53 McHugh, Aboriginal Title, supra note 8 at 20-24, 27-31, 107, and quotation accompanying
infra note 71.
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lands to a golf club. The Musqueam were induced to surrender the
lands to the Crown for this purpose, but were misled by those
government officials over the terms of the lease and were unable to
obtain a copy of it from Indian Affairs until 1970, after which they
commenced their legal action against the Crown.S4 The Supreme
Court decided that the Crown owes fiduciary obligations to First
Nations in the context of surrenders of reserve lands, and that the
Indian Affairs officials had breached these obligations almost thirty
years earlier by not providing the Musqueam with accurate information
and by proceeding with a lease that was not in their best interests.
In the Guerin decision, the Supreme Court did not purport to
create "new law" in 1984 and apply it retroactively to actions of the
Crown in the 1950s. Instead, the Court ruled that the relevant
fiduciary principles already existed in the 1950s and then applied
them to surrenders of reserve lands. So it was not an absence of law
that prevented the Musqueam from suing the Crown earlier, but
rather lack of access to justice caused in large part by the wrongful
actions of government officials acting on behalf of the Crown, which
actions also led the Court to hold that the legal proceedings were not
barred by limitation periods. Moreover, the fact that the government
officials seem to have thought they had discretion that was unfettered
by law (the Crown argued this in Guerin)ss was irrelevant, as it must
be in a constitutional monarchy governed by the rule of law where
it is up to the courts, not the executive branch of government, to
determine what the law iS.56
II. LEGAL HISTORIANS AS EXPERT WITNESSES
As mentioned above, McHugh has not limited his expression of
opinion on the absence of earlier law in relation to Aboriginal title
and on Crown discretion to his academic publications. He has been
saying the same thing even more forcefully as an expert witness for
the Crown in Canadian cases. The tenor of his testimony in
Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General),5 7 for example,
was summarized by the Ontario Court of Appeal:
One Crown expert, Dr. Paul Gerald McHugh, posits that
the government of the day did not regard the Royal
54 For an illuminating account of the history leading up to the legal proceedings and
detailed analysis of the judgments, see James I Reynolds, A Breach of Duty:
Fiduciary Obligations and Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich, 2005) at 25-125.
55 Guerin, supra note 48 at 384.
56 See Entick v Carrington (1765), 19 St Tr 1029, 95 ER 807 (CP); Roncarelli v Duplessis,
[1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689. The classic work on the rule of law is Dicey,
supra note 16, first published in 1885 during the period when McHugh contends
that there was no "law" governing Crown-Indigenous relations in North America.
57 [1999] 40 RPR (3d) 49, 88 ACWS (3d) 278 (Ont Sup Ct J).
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Proclamation [of 1763] as being operative even before the
passage of the Quebec Act [1774]. According to his evidence,
it would appear that instructions as to the treatment of
Indians, including the formalities for the surrender of Indian
lands, were treated as an ongoing exercise of the royal
prerogative. He further asserted that while the spirit of the
Royal Proclamation was respected in that all surrender
procedures were to be of a public nature, the specific
procedure in each case was a matter to be determined on a
case-by-case basis by the Governor in Council.5 8
In that case, the Court of Appeal declined to express an opinion on
the legal status of the Royal Proclamation,5 9 while observing that
"[t]here can be little doubt that from the aboriginal perspective, the
Royal Proclamation was perceived as an authoritative and enduring
statement of the principles governing their relationship with the
Crown." 60
More recently, McHugh was an expert witness in Ross River
Dena Council v. Canada (Attorney General),6 1 decided by the Yukon
Supreme Court in 2012 but overturned by the Yukon Court of Appeal
in May of the following year.62 The case involves the legal status and
58 195 DLR (4th) 135 at para 200, [2001] 1 CNLR 56 [Chippewas of Sarnia], leave to
appeal to SCC refused, [2001] 3 SCR vi. See also McHugh, "Politics of
Historiography," supra note 8, commenting on this case. Compare Brian Slattery,
The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples (Saskatoon: University of
Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979); Walters, supra note 29 at 826, 831.
59 The Court nonetheless held, on the authority of its own decision in Ontario
(Attomey-General) v Bear Island Foundation, 58 DLR (4th) 117, [1989] 2 CNLR 73,
aff'd on other grounds [1991] 2 SCR 570, 83 DLR (4th) 381, that "the surrender
provisions of the Royal Proclamation were revoked by the Quebec Act, 1774, RSC
1985, App. II, No. 2" (Chippewas of Sarnia, ibid at paras 19, 206-219). With all due
respect, this is doubtful (see Kent McNeil, "The High Cost of Accepting Benefits
from the Crown: A Comment on the Temagami Indian Land Case", Case Comment
(1992) 1 CNLR 40, reprinted in Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in
Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, Native Law Centre,
2001) 25 at 42-44 [McNeil, Emerging Justice?]).
60 Chippewas of Sarnia, ibid at para 201. See also Alain Beaulieu, "'An Equitable Right
to Be Compensated': The Dispossession of the Aboriginal Peoples of Quebec and
the Emergence of a New Legal Rationale (1760-1860)" (2013) 94:1 The Canadian
Historical Review 1.
61 2012 YKSC 4, [2012] 2 CNLR 276 [Ross River YSC].
62 2013 YKCA 6, [2013] 4 CNLR 355 [Ross River YCA]. The Court of Appeal decided
that the trial judge should not have severed the issue of the justiciability of
Canada's undertakings in the context of the Rupert's Land and North-Western
Territory Order, 23 June 1870, in RSC 1985, App II, No 9 [Rupert's Land Order], from
the other issues in the case, and so sent the matter back to be tried as a whole. The
case has been set down for trial in September, 2014.
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application of the following undertaking by the Parliament of Canada
in relation to the transfer of Rupert's Land and the North-Western
Territory to Canada in 1870:
And furthermore, that, upon the transference of the territories
in question to the Canadian Government, the claims of
the Indian tribes to compensation for lands required for
purposes of settlement will be considered and settled in
conformity with the equitable principles which have
uniformly governed the British Crown in its dealings with
the aborigines. 63
This undertaking (hereinafter the "equitable principles undertaking")
was one of the terms and conditions under which the Queen transferred
these territories to the newly-created Dominion of Canada by the
Rupert's Land and North-Western Territory Order, 1870, which due to
s. 146 of the Constitution Act, 1867,64 has the force and effect of an
Imperial statute and forms part of the Constitution of Canada. 65
Justice Gower stated the following threshold question to be addressed
in this context: "Were the terms and conditions referred to in the
Rupert's Land and North-western Territory Order of June 23, 1870
concerning 'the claims of the Indian tribes to compensation for
lands required for purposes of settlement' intended to have legal
force and effect and give rise to obligations capable of being enforced
by this Court?" 66 It was in regard to this question, and in particular
on the legislative intention and executive understanding at the time
regarding the legal enforceability of this undertaking, that McHugh
acted as an expert witness. 67
During cross-examination, McHugh was asked whether he agreed
with the Ontario Court of Appeal in Chippewas of Sarnia that the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 "has been consistently cited in the case
63 Address to Her Majesty the Queen from the Senate and House of Commons of the
Dominion of Canada, 16 and 17 December 1867, Schedule A to the Rupert's Land
Order, ibid at 8.
64 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
65 See Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, listing the documents acknowledged by s 52(2)(b) to be
part of the Constitution of Canada.
66 Ross River YSC, supra note 61 at paras 2, 6.
67 Dr. McHugh was asked by Canada to provide an expert opinion on the
historical context of the 1870 Order to assist this Court in determining
the intention of Parliament in including terms about Aboriginal peoples.
He was also asked to address the legal understanding of the Crown's
role at the time of the 1870 Order and to provide an account of how
the Order would have been understood as a legal instrument at that
time.
Ibid at para 81.
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law from the earliest times as the defining source of the principles
governing the Crown in its dealing with the Aboriginal people of
Canada." 68 He responded:
[T]he word is principles... Principles are not rules. Principles-
you see, we're getting into an argument here about-I'm
resisting the suggestion that you're making it historically.
There was a perception that they were externally enforceable
standards that could be brought to bear against the Crown
for the conduct of its relations with First Nations. That is
a suggestion you are making, it seems to me, and that I'm
resisting, in the period that we're looking at, because
historically there was no perception that there were externally
enforceable standards that could be brought to bear against the
Crown.69
In his judgment at trial, Justice Gower observed that "the evidence of
Dr. McHugh on this point, which I discuss below and find to be
credible, casts doubt on the current justiciability of the Royal
Proclamation, notwithstanding its inclusion in the Constitution of
Canada, at s. 25."70
In his Expert Report, McHugh addressed the issue of the justiciability
of Aboriginal title claims generally prior to the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada in the late-twentieth century:
In the late-nineteenth century (and for most of the
twentieth), the Crown's relations with tribes in respect of
their land "rights" were conceived as a matter of non-
justiciable executive grace in the sense that the "trust" and
"guardianship" duties avowed by the Crown, including the
practice of obtaining formal cessions of their land, were
regarded as having a high moral character not enforceable
directly through court process... It was not until the courts
developed the common law doctrine of Aboriginal title
from the 1970s onwards that those collective land rights
68 Ibid at para 44, quoting Chippewas of Sarnia, supra note 58 at para 201.
69 Ibid at para 45 [emphasis added].
70 Ibid at para 47 (the reference is to s 25 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Compare R v
Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 at para 86, [2005] 2 SCR 220 (not cited in Ross
River YSC, supra note 61), where McLachlin CJC stated that "the Royal Proclamation
must be interpreted in light of its status as the 'Magna Carta' of Indian rights in
North America and Indian 'Bill of Rights': R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, [1982] 1 Q.B. 892 (C.A.), at 912." How, one might ask, can
the Royal Proclamation be the Magna Carta of Indian "rights" if its provisions are
not legal? See also Campbell v Hall (1774), 98 ER 1045, Lofft 655 (KB) [Campbell],
on the constitutional impact of other provisions in the Proclamation.
188 Saskatchewan Law Review 2014 Vol. 77
and associated Crown obligations became justiciable.
The Crown recognized the land rights of tribes and
negotiated for their cession but these practices were
undertaken as a matter of executive grace rather than from
any legal imperative compelling this treaty-making. These
relations engaged Crown beneficence and guardianship
but they were never regarded as justiciable or enforceable
by legal process-a possibility that the state of legal art
could not admit (until the late-twentieth century).71
McHugh apparently thinks that, because (in his view) Crown officials
from the time of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 to long after the
issuance of the Rupert's Land Order did not regard Aboriginal title
claims as justiciable, 72 the Parliament of Canada, in formulating its
71 Ross River YSC, supra note 61 at paras 84-85 (Evidence, Paul McHugh's Expert
Report at paras 9-10 [McHugh's Report]). See also para 20 of McHugh's Report.
Compare Connolly v Woolrich (1867), 17 RJRQ 75, 11 LCJ 197 (Qc SC), aff'd
Johnstone v Connolly (1869), 17 RJRQ 266, 1 CNLC 151 (Qc CA) [Connolly], where
Monk J stated that, after French and British assertions of sovereignty in the
interior of North America, "the Indian political and territorial right, laws, and
usages remained in full force" (ibid at 87 [emphasis added]). See discussion in
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal
Peoples, Self-Government, and the Constitution (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and
Services Canada, 1993) at 5-8. See also a speech given by the Earl of Dufferin,
Governor General of Canada, at Government House, Victoria, British Columbia,
20 September 1876:
[T]here has been an initial error ever since Sir James Douglass [sic] quitted
office [in 1864], in the Government of British Columbia neglecting to
recognise what is known as the Indian title. In Canada this has always
been done: no Government, whether provincial or central, has failed
to acknowledge that the original title to the land existed in the Indian
tribes and communities that hunted or wandered over them. Before we
touch an acre we make a treaty with the chiefs representing the bands
we are dealing with, and having agreed upon and paid the stipulated
price, oftentimes arrived at after a great deal of haggling and difficulty,
we enter into possession, but not until then do we consider that we are
entitled to deal with a single acre.
Henry Milton, ed, Speeches and Addresses of the Right Honourable Frederick Temple
Hamilton Earl of Dufferin (London: John Murray, 1882) at 209 [Earl of Dufferin's
Speech].
72 Contrast Earl of Dufferin's Speech, ibid at 210: "1 consider that our Indian fellow-
subjects are entitled to exactly the same civil rights under the law as are possessed
by the white population, and that if an Indian can prove a prescriptive right of
way to a fishing station, or a right of any other kind, that that right should no
more be ignored than if it were the case of a white man." McHugh might contend
that this statement applies only to the private rights of individual Indians, not to
communal Indian land rights (see McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, supra note 29 at
155, where this kind of distinction is made), but in fact, the context makes clear
that the Governor General had the communal rights of the Indigenous peoples of
British Columbia in mind (see passage in supra note 71).
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Address in 1867 and the Queen in approving the terms and conditions
contained therein in 1870, cannot have intended the equitable
principles undertaking to have legal force.73
One can dispute McHugh's opinion on the views of Crown officials
at the time on this issue of the legal status of Indigenous land rights
and the equitable principles undertaking.74 But even if one agrees
73 At one level, McHugh is right when he asserts that Crown undertakings in the
Royal Proclamation and the Rupert's Land Order were not justiciable in the sense
that they were not enforceable in the Crown's courts. This is because, prior to the
enactment of Crown liability statutes in the United Kingdom and Canada from
the middle of the twentieth century, no one's rights were enforceable in court
against the Crown without the Crown's consent (see supra note 41). However,
from his academic writing and expert testimony McHugh's position seems to be
that Aboriginal land rights and Crown promises in regard thereto were non-
justiciable, not just because there were jurisdictional barriers preventing their
enforcement in court, but because they were not legal (I think this is apparent from
his reliance on the royal prerogative and his use of terms such as "executive grace"
(see supra notes 58 and 71). I am grateful to Professor Hamar Foster for reminding
me of the important point that rights can be legal without being justiciable. For
example, some statutes of limitation bar an owner of personal property from
going to court to recover for wrongful taking (e.g. conversion) after the limitation
period has passed, but do not extinguish the owner's legal title (see Miller v Dell,
[1891] 1 QB 468, 60 LJQB 404 (CA); Barberree vBilo (1991), 126 AR 121, 84 Alta LR
(2d) 216 (QB); Eileen E Gillese, Property Law: Cases, Text and Materials, 2d ed
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1990) at 3:38-3:39). See generally Lorne M Sossin,
Boundaries of Judicial Review: The Law of Justiciability in Canada, 2d ed (Toronto:
Carswell, 2012).
74 See e.g. Frank J Tough, "Aboriginal Rights Versus the Deed of Surrender: The Legal
Rights of Native Peoples and Canada's Acquisition of the Hudson's Bay Company
Territory" (1992) 17:2 Prairie Forum 225. See also Report of the Minister and
Deputy Minister of Justice for Canada to the Governor General (19 January 1875)
in which the authors expressed their "duty to assert such a legal or equitable claim
as may be found to exist on the part of the Indians" (ibid [emphasis omitted]) in
British Columbia where, apart from the Vancouver Island treaties entered into in
the 1850s, land cessions had not been obtained. On their recommendation,
Canada disallowed a provincial statute, An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws
Affecting Crown Lands in British Columbia, 1875, 38 Vict, c 65 because it did not
respect Indian rights (Ross River YSC, supra note 61 at paras 53-58 quoting Report,
ibid). In cross-examination on this report, McHugh is recorded in the judgment as
opining that, "notwithstanding the language used by the two law officers, there
was no pattern of matters of Aboriginal title being enforced in courts at that time
and that this particular Report was 'not indicative of a general understanding' in
that regard" (ibid at para 57). But how could a "pattern of matters of Aboriginal
title being enforced in courts" emerge when Indigenous peoples had no knowledge
of such a possibility and no capacity to commence legal action? Even in the first
important case involving Aboriginal title in Canada, St Catherine's Milling, (supra
note 35) in the 1880s, there were no Indigenous parties or witnesses. Nonetheless,
despite McHugh's opinion to the contrary (see Ross River YSC, supra note 61 at
paras 120-26), the St Catherine's Milling case confirms the legal uncertainty over
Indian land rights expressed by the law officers of the Crown in their 1875 Report.
In that case, Canada argued that, "inasmuch as the proclamation [of 1763] recites
that the territories thereby reserved for Indians had never 'been ceded to or
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with him on this issue (which I do not),75 the question remains:
why are the views of Crown officials even relevant to this issue of
legal status? To answer this, we have to know whose opinions are
being considered. While this is not clear from the extensive references
to McHugh's testimony by Justice Gower in his judgment in the Ross
River case, McHugh's Report reveals that he relies largely on a dispatch
in relation to the Rupert's Land transfer dated 10 April 1869, from the
Colonial Secretary, Earl Granville, to Sir John Young, the Governor
General of Canada, in which Granville referred to the "uncertain
rights" of the Indian tribes and the "obligations" of Canada to protect
them in face of "the advance of civilized man." 76 Beyond this
"evidence" of the perception of Crown officials in his Report,77 in
McHugh's oral testimony as explicitly relied upon by Justice Gower
one finds only vague statements, such as "historically there was no
perception that there were externally enforceable standards that could
be brought to bear against the Crown" and "the Crown's relations
with tribes in respect of their land 'rights' were conceived as a matter
of non-justiciable executive grace."7 8
These statements raise the questions of whose "perception" is
being referred to and who (besides Earl Granville, as questionably
purchased by' the Crown, the entire property of the land remained with them"
(St Catherine's Milling, ibid at 54). Although the Privy Council rejected that argument
while declining to express an opinion on exact nature of Indian title, the fact
Canada would make such an argument reveals that there was sufficient doubt in
the 1880s over the legal nature of Aboriginal land rights for Crown counsel to
think the argument was worth making and might be accepted. Indeed, Lord
Watson observed that "[t]here was a great deal of learned discussion at the Bar
with respect to the precise quality of the Indian right" (ibid at 55), confirming that
the Indians did have a right to the land but revealing disagreement over the
nature thereof.
75 See Kent McNeil, Native Claims in Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory:
Canada's Constitutional Obligations (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native
Law Centre, 1982) [McNeil, Canada's Constitutional Obligations] and "Fiduciary
Obligations and Federal Responsibility for the Aboriginal Peoples" in McNeil,
Emerging Justice?, supra note 59, 309 at 326-40 [McNeil, "Fiduciary Obligations"].
76 McHugh's Report, supra note 71 at paras 22-25; Glanville's dispatch can be found
in Parliament, Sessional Papers, No 25 (1869) at 37-38.
77 Compare my perspective on this dispatch in McNeil, "Fiduciary Obligations", supra
note 75 at 329-30: "Earl Granville thus foresaw the dangers to the Indian tribes
inherent in the transfer of the two territories to Canada, and impressed on the
Governor General that Canada would have an obligation to protect them against
these dangers." I then present reasons why this obligation is not just legal, it is
constitutional. See also McNeil, Canada's Constitutional Obligations, supra note 75.
78 Ross River YSC, supra note 61 at paras 45, 85. See text accompanying supra notes
69, 71, for quotations containing these phrases. In his Report, McHugh does
provide a couple of specific examples of opinions expressed by executive officers
in the 1830s that relations with the Indian tribes in British North America were a
matter of royal prerogative (supra note 71 at paras 37, 51).
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interpreted by McHugh) "conceived" of the matter in this way.
McHugh evidently does not have Indigenous people in mind, despite
the fact that they seem to have generally regarded promises made to
them by the Crown as binding.79 Nor does he seem to have judges in
mind, as he points out that the issue of the justiciability of
Indigenous land rights was not judicially determined in Canada until
the latter part of the twentieth century,80 in decisions that reveal that
the perception upon which he relies was legally erroneous.8 1 Nor
does McHugh point to legislation as the source of this perception, as
he apparently uses the alleged perception to determine the intention
of the Imperial and Canadian Parliaments in 1867-70, rather than the
other way around. In other words, he concludes that it cannot have
been the intention of these Parliaments for the equitable principles
undertaking to be legally enforceable because the perception at the
time was that the land rights of the Indigenous peoples were "a matter
of non-justiciable executive grace." 82 So the perception McHugh
alleges to be present in the historical record is the perception, not of
the judicial or legislative branches of the Imperial and Canadian
79 See the statement by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Chippewas of Sarnia, supra
note 58. Regarding Crown promises in treaties, see Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal
Council et al, The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7 (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1996); John Borrows, "Wampum at Niagara: The Royal
Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government" in Michael Asch,
ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for
Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 155; Harold Cardinal & Walter
Hildebrandt, Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That Our Peoples Will One
Day Be Clearly Recognized as Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000);
James (Sa'ke'j) Youngblood Henderson, Treaty Rights in the Constitution of Canada
(Toronto: Carswell, 2007); Michael Asch, On Being Here to Stay: Treaties and
Aboriginal Rights in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014), at 73-99.
80 See McHugh's Report supra note 71. See also Ross River YSC, supra note 61 at para
57, quoted in supra note 74. In McHugh's Report, ibid at paras 48-49, he does give
one example of a decision by Robinson CJ of the Upper Canada Queen's Bench in
Doe d Sheldon vRamsey (1852), 9 UCQB 105, 3 NBR 259, holding that the Haldimand
Grant to the Six Nations in 1784 did not create a legal right to the granted land,
but that decision involved the court's assessment of Governor Haldimand's
authority and intention in making the grant, not a judicial determination of
Aboriginal rights (see Walters, supra note 29 at 831, n40). Surprisingly, in his
Report McHugh does not mention Connolly, supra note 71, a well-known and
directly relevant case decided just five months before the Parliament of Canada
included the equitable principles undertaking in its Address to the Queen, where
Monk J expressed the view that the "territorial right" of the Indian tribes in
Rupert's Land remained in full force after Crown assertion of sovereignty. Monk J
also held that Indigenous laws, including laws relating to marriage, remained in
full force in Rupert's Land in 1803 (133 years after the Hudson's Bay Company
Charter) and were a source of rights enforceable in Canadian courts.
81 See Calder, supra note 36; Guerin, supra note 48; Delgamuukw, supra note 46.
82 McHugh's Report, supra note 71 at paras 9-10, as quoted in Ross River YSC, supra
note 61 at paras 85. See text accompanying supra note 71.
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governments, but mainly of Earl Granville and other members of the
executive branch, as clairvoyantly revealed by McHugh.83
This takes us back to the rule of law: from the constitutional
crisis in England in the seventeenth century, Parliament and the
common law courts emerged supreme over the executive. As Chief
Justice Coke had decided in the Proclamations Case,84 the Crown,
acting executively (i.e. without the authorization of Parliament), does
not have the constitutional authority to change or make law.85
Consequently, the rights of British subjects, including their land
rights, are protected by the common law against executive action, or,
to put it another way, against the prerogative of the Crown. 86 Yet
McHugh seems to think that Crown dealing with the communally-
83 Even if McHugh is right (which is highly questionable, see supra notes 72-75) that
there was a consensus among Crown officials in the nineteenth century that
Indigenous peoples in Canada had no legal land rights, one needs to keep in mind
the cautionary words of Justice Hall (dissenting on other grounds) in Calder, supra
note 36 at 346:
The assessment and interpretation of the historical documents and
enactments tendered in evidence must be approached in the light of
present-day research and knowledge disregarding ancient concepts
formulated when understanding of the customs and culture of our
original people was rudimentary and incomplete and when they were
thought to be wholly without cohesion, laws or culture, in effect a
subhuman species.
In other words, to the extent that past perceptions of Indigenous peoples' rights
were based on erroneous factual assumptions, they can have no validity. For a
stark example, consider Chancellor Boyd's trial decision in the St Catharines case,
where he described Indigenous people not living on reserves variously as "wild,"
"primitive," "untaught," "uncivilized," "rude," and "degraded," apparently without
evidence being presented in court to substantiate this assessment (R v The St
Catharines Milling and Lumber Co (1885), 10 OR 196 at 211, 227-28). After admit-
ting that "little is known of the people in this remote region" (the area of Treaty
3, entered into in 1873), he nonetheless concluded that most of them were "a
more than usually degraded Indian type" (ibid at 227). For discussion connecting
his judgment with discredited nineteenth-century theories of the evolution of
human societies from "barbarism to civilization" (ibid at 228), see Kent McNeil,
"Social Darwinism and Judicial Conceptions of Indian Title in Canada in the
1880s" (1999) 38:1 Journal of the West 68.
84 (1610), 12 Co Rep 74, 77 ER 1352 (KB).
85 See also Herbert Broom, Constitutional Law Viewed in Relation to Common Law, 2d
ed by George L Denman (London: W Maxwell & Son, 1885) at 245, 386-88. On
the development of the rule of law as a constitutional principle, see William Huse
Dunham, "Regal Power and the Rule of Law: A Tudor Paradox" (1964) 3:2 Journal
of British Studies 24.
86 See Field v Boethsby (1657), 2 Sid 137 at 140, 82 ER 1298 (KB): "The prerogative of
the King will not destroy or prejudice the property of the subject." See also Nichols
v Nichols (1576), 2 P1 Com 477 at 487, 75 ER 711 (CP); Attorney-General v De
Keyser's Royal Hotel, Ltd, [1920] All ER Rep 80 at 106-107, [1920] AC 508 HL (Eng);
Eshugbayi Eleko v Office Administering the Government of Nigeria, [1931] All ER Rep
44 at 49, [1931] AC 662 (PC).
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held lands of the Indigenous peoples was a matter of royal prerogative,
not governed by law.87 He bases this conclusion, not on a denial that
Indigenous people were British subjects" and therefore not protected
by the common law at the relevant time (1867-70 in the context of
the Rupert's Land Order), but rather on the perception that they had
no legal rights to these lands. 89 This, on McHugh's own admission,
was not the result of judicial determination or legislative enactment.
Rather, he opines that it was the view of the executive, whose officers
did not conceive that the Indians could have legal rights. 90 But since
when does the perception of the executive in relation to legal rights
determine the law? While this may have been the attitude of the
seventeenth-century Stuart kings of England, it was also a major
reason why one was beheaded in 1649 and another deposed in 1688;
their views of kingship and prerogative power were out of touch with
the constitutional monarchy that England had become. 91
So whatever the views of executive officers of the Crown on the
land rights of Indigenous peoples in British North America, those views,
to the extent they can be ascertained from the historical record, are
matters of fact, not law. However, McHugh did extrapolate from
those views and arrive at legal conclusions in relation to two issues
in particular. First, as we have seen, he testified that there was no
intention at the time of the Rupert's Land transfer that the equitable
87 Ross River YSC, supra note 61 at paras 57, 150; McHugh, "Politics of Historiography,"
supra note 8 at 189-95.
88 McHugh, "Politics of Historiography," ibid at 189, 193. For confirmation that
Indigenous people living within the Dominions of the Crown were regarded as
British subjects at the time, see Earl of Dufferin's Speech, supra note 71 at 210,
quoted in supra note 72.
89 See also McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, supra note 29 at 155-56.
90 See McHugh, "Politics of Historiography," supra note 8.
91 See Theodore FT Plucknett, Taswell-Langmead's English Constitutional History: From
the Tentonic Conquest to the Present Time, 11th ed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960)
at 328-460. As discussed in Dicey, supra note 16, parliamentary sovereignty and
the rule of law prevailed over prerogative power. See also Blackstone, supra note
32, vol 1 at 136-37, 226-32; Chitty, supra note 32 at 7-9. Compare McHugh's
Report, supra note 71 at para 54, stating that, at the time of the Rupert's Land
transfer in 1870, "the idea of a constitution as a substantive normative constraint
upon governmental authority had not taken hold." Nor can it be argued that the
constitutional protections of the rights of British subjects did not apply in the
colonies, for in settled colonies, and conquered and ceded colonies where the
common law had been introduced or a legislative assembly had been promised or
created (see Campbell, supra note 70), the royal prerogative was subject to the
same constitutional constraints as in England. See Chitty, ibid at 25-39, stating at
32-33 that, if the charter granted to the subjects of a colony "be silent on the
subject it cannot be doubted, but that the King's prerogatives in the colony are
precisely those prerogatives which he may exercise in the mother country.. .Where
the colonial charters afford no criterion.. .the common law of England, with
respect to the royal prerogative, is the common law of the plantations".
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principles undertaking would be legally enforceable. 92 Justice Gower
accepted this opinion, stating that on "the intention of the Canadian
Parliament when the 1867 Address was drafted and the intention of
the Imperial Parliament when the 1870 Order was enacted," 93 he
"generally accepted Dr. McHugh's expert opinion evidence that the
relevant provision [the equitable principles undertaking] was not
intended to have justiciable legal force and effect." 94 Secondly,
McHugh stated repeatedly that there was no law in relation to
Indigenous land rights in what is now Canada during the period
under consideration. 95 On both these issues, one needs to ask
whether his testimony went beyond the permissible scope of expert
testimony, as legislative intention and the existence of domestic
law are legal, not factual, matters. 96 If McHugh's testimony as a legal
historian related only to a matter of domestic law as it existed in the
past, arguably it would come within Maitland's "logic of evidence" as
historical "fact." However, if the law in the past is the law that the court
is being asked to apply in the present to the case before it, then testimony
on that law could cross over into Maitland's "logic of authority,"
taking it outside the scope of expert testimony. If, for example, the
question before the court involves the interpretation of legislation
that is still in force and that relates to the matter before the court, the
legislative intent is a matter of domestic law that is up to the judge to
determine, regardless of when the statute was enacted. 97
92 See Ross River YSC, supra note 61 at paras 94-106.
93 Ibid at para 136. Note, however, that the Rupert's Land Order was issued by the
Queen, not enacted by Parliament, though the Order had effect as if it "had been
enacted by the Parliament of the United Kingdom" (Constitution Act, 1867, supra
note 64, s 146).
94 Ross River YSC, supra note 61 at para 139.
95 Ibid at paras 45, 57, 84-86, 107, 129, 132-33. See also McHugh's Report, supra note
71 at para 55.
96 On the duty of judges to ascertain legislative intent, see P St J Langan, Maxwell on
the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th ed (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1969) at 1; FAR
Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation: A Code, 5th ed (London: LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2008) at 123; Pierre-Andr6 Cote, The Interpretation of Legislation in
Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) at 5-6, 13-14, 315 -24. On domestic law,
see references in supra note 2.
97 In Willick v Willick, [1994] 3 SCR 670 at 699, 119 DLR (4th) 405, L'Heureux-Dub6
J, in relation to interpretation of provisions of the Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd
Supp), stated: "The task of statutory interpretation requires that courts discover
the intention of Parliament"; see also ibid, Sopinka J at 679-680. Legislative intent
is ascertained from the context, purpose, and text of a statute (including the
grammatical and ordinary sense of the language used), and from the application
of rules of statutory interpretation, not from trying to determine the factual,
subjective intent of the members of the legislature (see Randal N Graham,
Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Toronto: Emond Montgomery
Publications, 2001) at 18-20; Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation, 2d ed (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2007) at 32-33, 37-42; Rizzo &Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27, 154
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III. THE COMMON LAW TRADITION
Of course McHugh is entitled to express an opinion as an academic,
though probably not as an expert witness, on the existence of
Canadian law in relation to Indigenous land rights. As we have
seen, he has done this in his published work, denying that there was
any such law prior to what he calls "the breakthrough cases" in the
last 40 years or so. 98 From his opinion that there was no law follows
his conclusion that there were no legal rights. But how do we know
there was no law? McHugh says this was the perception of the
Crown's executive officers, but as we have seen they do not have the
constitutional authority to determine whether law and rights exist;
they can only express opinions on the matter. Since McHugh must be
aware of this fundamental limitation on executive authority arising
from the constitutional separation of powers,99 I think his conclusion
that there was no law on the matter until recently necessarily rests on
his cursory dismissal of the declaratory theory of law, as he seems to
think there was no law in relation to Indigenous land rights until a
court decision or competent legislature acknowledged those rights
and gave them legal force. He regards those who hold a contrary view
as "wedded (blinkered, more like) to the declaratory theory" of law. 100
As discussed above, one does not have to adhere to a Platonic
conception of the declaratory theory to realize that non-statutory law
can exist before judges articulate it in particular cases. 101 Nor does
one need to resort to natural law theories or Dworkinian conceptions
of fundamental rights, though these are relevant and can influence
DLR (4th) 193; Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership vRex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 SCR
559). Judges can, however, take judicial notice of and receive expert testimony on
facts pertaining to the context and purpose of a statute (known as "legislative
facts"), but legislative intent is still a legal question (see Sullivan, ibid at 159-60;
R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688, 171 DLR (4th) 385; Canada 3000 Inc, (Re), 2006
SCC 24 at paras 36-40, [2006] 1 SCR 865). On judicial notice of legislative facts,
see R v Spence, 2005 SCC 71 at paras 57-68, [2005] 3 SCR 458.
98 See McHugh, Aboriginal Title, supra note 8 at 29-31 and quotation accompanying supra
note 32. Note that this denial applies to the law of the Canadian state; McHugh
is not denying that Indigenous peoples have land rights under their own laws.
99 See McHugh, "Politics of Historiography," supra note 8 at 173.
100 McHugh, Aboriginal Title, supra note 8 at 283, quoted supra note 23. See also ibid at
282, 310; McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, supra note 29, where he says that this
"notion of immanence according to which all law is already and previously
'made"' stems from "whiggish or presentist technique" (ibid at 18).
101 One can also point to local custom that must have been in existence long before
declared by judges to be legally enforceable, presumably from the time Richard I
became king in 1189. See Allen, supra note 31 at 129-46, especially at 130: "if a
custom is proved in an English court by satisfactory evidence to exist and to be
observed, the function of the court is merely to declare the custom operative law".
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judicial decision-making.102 The common law itself is a rich body of
principles and precedents that can be and are adapted and applied in
new contexts virtually every time an appeal court makes a decision.
Moreover, as the influential English legal historian Brian Simpson
has pointed out, it is often impossible to identify the case in which a
particular principle or rule was first articulated. 103 Rather, like the
English language, the common law developed out of custom and
usage, with authority to formulate the law on an ongoing basis
assigned to the judiciary:
Formulations of the common law are to be conceived of as
similar to grammarians' rules, which both describe linguistic
practices and attempt to systematize and order them; such
rules serve as guides to proper practice since the proper
practice is in part the normal practice; such formulations
are inherently corrigible, for it is always possible that they
may be improved upon, or require modification as what
they describe changes.104
Though McHugh might deny it,' 0 s I think his argument that
Indigenous land claims were not legal before the latter part of the
twentieth century is an extreme positivist position that is contrary
to the common law tradition. 106 For him, it seems that law does
not exist until made by a legislature or court (i.e. by command of the
legislative or judicial arm of the sovereign state). Jeremy Bentham,
whose forceful positivism has influenced generations of legal theorists
102 See e.g. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980)
[Finnis, Natural Rights]; John Finnis, ed, Natural Law (New York: New York University
Press, 1991); Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1986). As William Geldart observed, "[i]n the absence of clear precedents
which might govern a question, we find judges relying on such considerations
as the opinions of legal writers, the practice of conveyancers, the law of other
modern countries, the Roman law, principles of 'natural justice,' or public policy"
(WM Geldart, Elements of English Law (London: Williams and Norgate, 1911) at
23). To the same effect, see Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 41.
103 Sir Matthew Hale made the same point three centuries earlier in The History of the
Common Law ofEngland (London: J Nutt, 1713) at 59-60. See also Baker, Law's Two
Bodies, supra note 28 at 1-31.
104 See AWB Simpson, "The Common Law and Legal Theory" in AWB Simpson, ed,
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 2d series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) 77 at 94.
See also Gerald J Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1986) at 9-11.
105 See McHugh, Aboriginal Societies, supra note 29 at 18-20, where he links whiggish thinking,
the declaratory theory, and positivism, apparently disapproving of each of them.
106 On the rejection of the declaratory theory by positivists, see Wesley-Smith, supra
note 24 at 74-75.
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in England from John Austin 10 7 to H.L.A. Hart10 8 and beyond, was of
like mind, leading him to question the very existence of the common
law "as a system of general rules," since for him there could be no
law in relation to a particular matter until created by a judge or
legislature.1 09 This led Bentham to conclude that the exercise of
judicial power in England is arbitrary.11 0 After asserting that judges
"make the common law," he used an extreme analogy to describe the
judicial process: "Do you know how they make it? Just as a man
makes laws for his dog. When your dog does anything you want to
break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This
is the way you make laws for your dog: and this is the way the judges
make law for you and me."111 While Bentham's scepticism about
the common law may seem excessive, he does have a point; if no
law exists before a judge decides a case on a particular matter, the
judge's decision is necessarily retroactive to the facts of the case that
transpired previously,112 and in that sense the decision is arbitrary.
One can view the declaratory theory of law as an answer to Bentham,
though of course the theory pre-dates the writings of the famous
positivist. 113 But if one discards the theory entirely, one does have to
confront the problem of the retrospective nature of judicial law-
making, 114 which Bentham did by proposing the codification of English
law, as happened with French private law during his lifetime when
the Napoleonic Civil Code was created, largely out of Roman law.
Short of replacing the common law with an English equivalent of
the Civil Code, jurisdictions that adhere to the common law tradition
are obliged to accept the reality that judicial decisions can have
retroactive effect for the litigants in the case before the court.115 This
does not mean that judges, even in cases where they overrule previous
107 See Lectures on Jurisprudence (1861) (New York: Burt Franklin, 1970), vol 2 at 216:
"there can be no law without a legislative act" ("legislative act" taken here to
include judicial decision (see Simpson, supra note 104 at 84)), though Austin
describes "judicial law" as "improper legislation" (Austin, ibid at 321-22).
108 The Concept of Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
109 Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries: a criticism of William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the laws ofEngland, ed by Charles Warren Everett (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1928) at 125: "As a system of general rules, the common law is a thing
merely imaginary."
110 John Bowring, ed, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (1838-43) (New York: Russell &
Russell, 1962) vol 4 at 460.
111 Ibid, vol 5 at 235.
112 See Neil MacCormick, Rhetoric and The Rule of Law: A Theory of Legal Reasoning
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 160-61, 262-66.
113 See Hale, supra note 103 at 68-70; Blackstone, supra note 32, vol 1 at 68-71.
114 See Rupert Cross & JW Harris, Precedent in English Law, 4th ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1991) at 30-33; RHS Tur, "Time and the Law" (2002) 22:3 Oxford J of Legal Stud 463.
115 See discussion of Donoghue v Stevenson, [1932] All ER Rep 1, [1932] AC 562 HL (Eng)
in Cross & Harris, ibid at 31-33.
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decisions, are making new law out of whole cloth. 116 As Brian
Simpson suggests, it is not a matter of choosing between the two
extremes posed by John Austin, "either agreeing that the common
law was laid down by the judges, or believing in the childish fiction
(as [Austin] called it) that the common law was 'a miraculous
something made by nobody, existing, I suppose, from eternity, and
merely declared from time to time by the judges."'11 7 Judges have to
make decisions based on law, and when the law in relation to the
matter before them is in dispute (as it often is), they "must of course
choose between incompatible views, selecting one or other as the law,
and the fiction that the common law provides a unique solution is
only a way of expressing this necessity."118
In a recent article, "The Declaratory Theory of Law," Professor
Allan Beever argues convincingly that the scorn heaped upon the
theory by some critics stems from a misunderstanding, not only of
the theory itself, but of the conception of law that prevailed in
England before the advent of positivism and that is of continuing
relevance today.11 9 As an example of that earlier understanding, he
refers to Lord Coke's judgment in Calvin's Case,120 where the Chief
Justice, in answer to the defendant's objection that a judgment for
the plaintiff would be a dangerous innovation in the law, stated:
[T]his judgment was rather a renovation of the judgments
and censures of the reverend Judges and Sages of the law in
so many ages past, than any innovation, as it appeareth by
the books and book cases before recited: neither have
Judges power to judge according to that which they think
fit, but that which out of the laws they know to be right
and consonant to law.121
Beever contends that earlier judges and jurists (e.g. Coke, Hale, and
Blackstone) distinguished positive laws, consisting of rules laid down
by statute or stemming from particular cases, from the reason of the
law and fundamental principles, sometimes stated as legal maxims:
the former are subject to change whereas the latter generally are not.
116 See text accompanying supra note 27 for quotation from Parker, supra note 25.
117 Simpson, supra note 104 at 84, quoting John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence, or
the Philosophy of Positive Law, 4th ed by R Campbell (London: John Murray, 1879),
vol 2 at 655 [emphasis in original].
118 Simpson, ibid at 97.
119 (2013) 33:3 Oxford J of Legal Stud 421 [Beever, "Declaratory Theory"].
120 Calvin's Case (1608), 7 Co R 1, 77 ER 377.
121 Ibid at 27a. See also JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th ed
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 195: "Common lawyers before the
nineteenth century liked to think of their law as an unchanging body of common
sense and reasoning which was part of the heritage of the English people."
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Another way of stating this is that the letter of the law can change,
whereas the spirit of the law, based as it is on reason and underlying
values, is much more enduring.122 Moreover, Beever argues that the
modern common law adheres more closely to the pre-positivist
conception of the declaratory theory than most commentators, and
even some judges, are willing to admit. 123 To avoid accusations that
judges violate the separation of powers and improperly legislate
retroactively,124 one needs to distinguish between judicial development
of the positive law in conformity with underlying principles and
legislative alteration of it through the political process. 125 "in reality,"
Beever asserts, "change in the positive law is perfectly consistent
with the declaratory theory as long as that change can be seen to
accord with more abstract legal principles."126 He concludes that
these principles, forming as they do the basis of the common law, are
as much a part of it-indeed, are more fundamental to it-than the
evolving rules of positive law.127 I think Beever would agree, if the
122 This is not to say that the underlying values of a society do not change, as we have
seen in the past fifty years in Canada, during which equality, especially gender
and racial equality, have become fundamental values of Canadian society and law.
123 Beever, "Declaratory Theory," supra note 119, analyzing Lord Reid, "The Judge as
Lawmaker" (1972-73) 12:2Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 22, and
Lord Goff's judgment in Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council, [1998] 4 All ER
513, [1998] 3 WLR 1095 HL (Eng). For another perspective on the Kleinwort decision,
see MacCormick, supra note 112 at 262-66.
124 For an American perspective, see Fred V Cahill, Jr, Judicial Legislation: A Study in
American Legal History (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1952).
125 See Allen, supra note 31 at 307-10, distinguishing the law-making authority of
judges from that of legislatures. Allen utilizes this analogy:
A man who chops a tree into logs has in a sense 'made' the logs....
Mankind, with all its resource and inventiveness, is limited in its
creative power by the physical material vouchsafed to it. Similarly, the
creative power of courts is limited by existing legal material at their
command. They find the material and shape it. The legislature may
manufacture entirely new material.
Ibid at 309-10.
See also Geldart, supra note 102 at 23-27; Dennis Lloyd, The Idea of Law
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964) at 256-73. Likewise, John Finnis, "The
Fairy Tale's Moral" (1999) 115 Law Q Rev 170, republished as "Adjudication and
Legal Change" in John Finnis, Philosophy of Law: Collected Essays (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011) vol 4, 397 [Finnis, "Adjudication"], points out that the
declaratory theory is "a way of stating an important element in judicial duty,"
namely, "the duty of judges to differentiate their authority and responsibility, and
thus their practical reasoning, from that of legislatures" (ibid at 400).
126 Beever, "Declaratory Theory," supra note 119 at 440.
127 See also Allan Beever, "Formalism in Music and Law" (2011) 61:2 UTLJ 213 at 228-
29. Beever's point can be supported by many concrete examples: To take just one,
a murderer cannot inherit from the victim by will or intestacy, nor benefit as
survivor from a joint tenancy held with the victim. In these instances, the positive
law rules of inheritance and survivorship are overridden by legal principle,
expressed in the maxim, nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria (no
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word "permanent" were deleted or qualified,128 with Sir Carleton
Kemp Allen's observation that "underneath the whole elaborate
structure of precedents in our courts lies a permanent foundation of
fundamental legal doctrine." 129
Beever's deeper understanding of the intimate connection
between the declaratory theory and common law methodology can
be contrasted with McHugh's dismissive attitude towards "the
declaratory theory's belief that contemporary doctrine articulates
eternal verities" 130 and his apparent conviction that legal principles
are not law.131 Like Austin, McHugh seems to regard all law as positive
law that has no existence until brought into being by a court decision
or legislative enactment. This positivist viewpoint stems from a legal
theory that not only has its critics (especially in its extreme Austinian
form),1 32 but, as Simpson and others have pointed out, is at odds
with the common law tradition. 133 Yet as an expert witness, McHugh
implicitly relies on this controversial legal theory and purports to
present as "evidence" questionable opinions on the (non)existence
of law-opinions that to some extent seem to involve the content
of domestic law, which is beyond the permissible scope of expert
testimony.
As mentioned earlier, it is important to distinguish between a
legal academic's role as a scholar and the role he or she may choose
to play as an expert witness in litigation. The limitations on what is
permissible in a courtroom do not apply in the academic realm.
Indeed, a major aspect of a law professor's job is to describe, analyze,
and critique the law. However, in doing so one still has to keep in
mind Maitland's caution against mixing the "logic of evidence" and
the "logic of authority." In effect, McHugh tends to treat the existence
one can obtain an advantage by his own wrong) (see Lundy v Lundy (1895), 24 SCR
650; Nordstrom v Baumann, [1962] SCR 147, 31 DLR (2d) 255; Schobelt v Barber,
[1967] 1 OR 349 (HG); Singh Estate v Bajrangie-Singh (1991), 29 ETR (2d) 302, 89
ACWS (3d) 1219 (Ont SCJ)).
128 See Beever, "Declaratory Theory," supra note 119 at 441, where he states that he
"would not wish to defend precisely" the version of the theory that "these principles
are unalterable."
129 Allen, supra note 31 at 293. With the same deletion, I would also agree with Allen.
130 McHugh, Aboriginal Title, supra note 8 at 283, quoted more fully at supra note 23.
131 See quotation from his testimony from Ross River YSC, supra note 61 at para 45,
supra note 69.
132 See e.g. Lon L Fuller, The Morality ofLaw (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964);
Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford University Press, 1965);
Lloyd, supra note 125 at 95-115; Finnis, Natural Rights, supra note 102; Dworkin,
supra note 102 and Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1978); Foster, "One Good Thing," supra note 37 at 83-86.
For a historical overview, see JM Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) chs 8-10.
133 See also Geldart, supra note 102 at 23-27; Allen, supra note 31 at 1-8.
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of law in the past as a matter of historical fact that fits into the logic
of evidence. However, while a legal historian can probe and seek to
illuminate the existence and content of law in the past, in doing so
the logic of evidence necessarily mingles with the logic of authority.
As John Finnis has pointed out,
[1]aw has a double life. It is in force as a matter of fact;
historians and contemporary observers can describe-and
make predictions about-its content and effect by attending
to the opinions and practices prevalent among certain
persons and groups, especially courts and their officers. But
it has its force by directing the practical reasoning of those
persons and groups. 134
Judges have to make decisions based on the force of law as a normative
system of principles and rules, not on law as an evidential matter of
historical fact. In so doing, they are not "falsifying history," but
instead are determining the legal norms that apply to the historical
facts that have been ascertained by evidence. 135 When a case before
a court presents novel legal issues, as is often the situation in appeals,
the judges still have to say what the law is; they cannot throw up
their hands and exclaim that the case can't be decided because there
is no applicable law.136 This is as much the situation in cases involving
Indigenous rights as in other cases. The main difference is that the
historical facts giving rise to Indigenous cases are usually much
further back in the past, often decades or centuries, for a variety of
reasons, including Indigenous people's lack of knowledge of the
common law system and lack of access to the courts to have their
claims adjudicated. But this difference does not change the role of
the judges or the nature of adjudication, nor does it cause history to
be rewritten. As in all cases, judges rely on the historical record
presented in court as evidence, 137 and have to determine and apply
the law as they understand it. 13 8
134 Finnis, "Adjudication," supra note 125 at 397 [emphasis added].
135 See ibid at 401-402.
136 See Postema, supra note 104 at 11: "strictly novel cases call for judicial resolution."
Postema cites Lord Ellesmere, "The Speech of the Lord Chancellor of England, in
the Eschequer [sic] Chamber, Touching on the Post-Nati" (1608) in Louis A Knafla,
Law and Politics in Jacobean England: The Tracts of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977) 202 at 219: "There is a Rule in the
common Law, That in novo casu remedium est apponendum." The Case of the Post-
Nati is also known as Calvin's Case, supra note 120.
137 See Wiener, supra note 9 at 26: "The truth of historical assertions depends on facts
and facts alone," as established by evidence.
138 See Paul Roberts & Adrian Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004) at 132-33.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This paper challenges Paul McHugh's position, expressed in his
published work and on the witness stand, that there was no law in
relation to Indigenous land rights in Canada prior to decisions of the
Supreme Court in cases such as Calder,13 9 Guerin,140 and Delgamuukw.141
In my opinion, the Crown was bound by the common law and
constitutional documents, in particular the Royal Proclamation of
1763 and the Rupert's Land Order of 1870, to acknowledge the land
rights of the Indigenous peoples and to settle them through established
practices in accordance with legal principles. In other words, the
Crown's dealings with Indigenous peoples were not a matter of royal
prerogative and executive grace, but rather were governed by law. The
reason why Indigenous peoples did not go to court to assert their
land rights prior to the latter half of the twentieth century was not
because they had no legal rights, but rather because they were denied
access to justice by a variety of factors, including lack of knowledge
of Canadian law, inability to hire lawyers, and Crown immunity from
suit.
However, my intention in this paper is not just to challenge
McHugh's opinion on the historical existence of Indigenous land
rights. Beyond that, I hope to clarify the distinction between law and
history, and the role of legal historians in this context. History is a
matter of fact, provable in court through the testimony of witnesses
who have first-hand experience with the relevant events and qualified
experts who have studied the past and can provide opinions in relation
thereto. Every case that goes to court involves history, in the sense
that the events forming the basis for the claim necessarily happened
in the past. Most cases, however, involve fairly recent events that are
within the living memory of the participants and observers.
Indigenous claims, however, often involve events that happened
decades or centuries before. As witnesses with direct experience of the
events are no longer available, courts have to rely on the testimony
of experts, including Indigenous elders who are authorities on the
oral histories of their people, and trained historians who have studied
and written about the people and period in question.
In the common law system, the opinions of experts are admissible
insofar as they relate to factual matters. Experts cannot offer opinions
on the domestic law to be applied in deciding a case as judges are
expected to know that law and should not accept expert testimony
on it, as that would permit experts to impinge on the judicial role and
139 Supra note 36.
140 Supra note 48.
141 Supra note 46.
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duty.142 This distinction between questions of fact that are provable
though witnesses and questions of law that are within the purview of
judges is fundamental. 143 It is as applicable in Indigenous rights cases
as in other cases, with the above-mentioned difference that in cases
involving Indigenous rights opinions of experts on the historical facts
are often needed because the events usually took place before living
memory.
I do not think there is any controversy over this distinction
between historical fact and applicable domestic law, and the proper
role of historians as such in the courtroom. However, the distinction
becomes murky when the expert is a legal historian because legal
history obviously involves both history and law. So where is the line
between these to be drawn when a legal historian testifies as an
expert? Clearly, a legal historian cannot testify and offer opinions on
the domestic law that the judge will have to apply in deciding the
case. However, there would not seem to be any problem with a legal
historian offering an opinion on what the law was at some time in
the past, as long as that is not the law that the judge will have to apply,
because the existence of law in the past can be viewed as historical
fact. 144 But if the law in the past is the law that the judge will have
to apply, it is a different matter: in that situation, it seems to me that
the existence and content of that law is for the judge to determine,
and the opinion of a legal historian on those issues is both irrelevant
and inadmissible.
142 On the judicial duty to determine the applicable law, see supra note 27 for the
quotation from Lord Donaldson's judgment in Parker. However, the domestic law
judges are expected to know does not include local custom (in England, at least)
or Indigenous law (in Canada), which can be proven by expert testimony (supra
note 2).
143 See Keane, Griffiths & McKeown, supra note 2 at 524-32; Delisle, Stuart & Tanovich,
supra note 2 at 858-929.
144 See supra note 134 for the quotation from Finnis.
